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We have many experiences every day, and we tend to parse them into individual events. While 
many studies have been conducted to understand the nature of event segmentation, less is known 
how event memories change over time. In the present study, participants watched a movie clip, 
and then were asked to immediately retell what they had seen. They performed the same free re-
call task a week later. We found that the passage of time did not significantly affect the number 
of recalled events or the detailedness of event memories. We discuss potential explanations for 
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 On any given day, we have many experiences which can range from mundane (e.g. going 
to work)to highly significant (e.g. getting married). Our ability to recall these experiences is 
known as episodic memory (Tulving, 1972; 2002). The constituents of each episode include a 
time and place as well as characters, actions and causal relationships (Baldassano, Hasson, & 
Norman 2018). While episodes are assumed to be stored in memory as individual units or 
chunks, we do not initially experience them as discrete events but rather as a continuous stream 
of incoming information. Because of this discrepancy, we do not fully understand how  we are 
able to recall episodes as distinct units.    
According to event segmentation theory (EST), we parse continuous experiences into dis-
crete events (Reynolds, Zacks, & Braver, 2007). The theory further posits that this segmentation 
process is guided by active mental models of the content and relational (temporal, spatial, causal) 
structure of an ongoing event. Event models are structured representations of events that are used 
to gain information about time, location, and other important features of a situation (Richmond & 
Zacks, 2017). However, event models are not simply based on the current situation. Rather, evi-
dence suggests that event models also involve schematic knowledge of how the world is struc-
tured (Baldassano et. al., 2018). For example, if you arrive at a restaurant, your model of this 
event involves not only the current features of the event—specific time of day, number of people 
in the restaurant, etc.—but also your expectation about what typically happens during a restau-
rant visit, e.g., that soon after being seated, a server will bring you a menu. This expectation is 
not based on the current situation, but on knowledge acquired from previous experience at res-
taurants. According to a prominent view, event models are updated when the current sensory in-




Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007). This updating process generates an event boundary, 
the point at which one event ends and the next begins. Event boundaries are thought to trigger 
rapid retroactive encoding of the prior experience into a discretized episodic memory trace, al-
lowing the event model to be later reinstated (e.g., Baldassano, Chen, Zadbood, Pillow, Hasson, 
& Norman 2017). There is, however, some debate as to how event boundaries are determined. 
Others have argued that contextual stability (e.g., temporal, spatial)—rather than prediction er-
rors per se—dictate event boundaries (Clewett & Davachi, 2017; for a theory that integrates the 
latter account into the former, see Franklin, Norman, Ranganath, Zacks, & Gersman, 2020). The 
latter view assumes continuous, proactive binding of the elements of experience that is inter-
rupted by boundaries. Both perspectives agree that event boundaries coincide with changes in sa-
lient features, temporal and spatial regularities, or causal relationships in the environment.  
Explicit judgements about event boundaries in narratives, movies, or action sequences 
have been found to be highly consistent across human observers and coincide with shifts in the 
stability of fMRI and EEG activity patterns (Baldassano et al., 2017; Silva, Baldassano, & Fuent-
emilla, 2019). That is, each episodic event is associated with a unique neural signature, resulting 
in a stable pattern of neural activity throughout that same event despite variation in the ongoing 
sensory input. 
Importantly, the representational structure that is created during perception has been 
shown to exert a profound impact on the recall of past events (Baldassano et al., 2017; Chen, 
Leong, Honey, Yong, Norman, & Hasson, 2017; Silva et al., 2019). Perceived event boundaries 
coincide with two (potentially related) phenomena that are predictive of later recall: (a) spikes in 
hippocampal activity and (b) rapid replay of the just-encoded event. Boundary-related activity 




that are forgotten, indicating that the hippocampus forms an episodic memory representation of 
the just-concluded event that can be later retrieved into the same cortical regions that encoded 
the event during perception. Indeed, event-specific brain activity patterns have been found to be 
reactivated during successful subsequent recall of an event–although undergoing systematic 
transformation (reorganization) from perception to recall (Baldassano et al., 2017; Ben-Yakov & 
Henson, 2018; Chen et al., 2017). Studies capitalizing on the high temporal resolution of scalp 
EEG recordings have revealed that event boundaries trigger a rapid reinstatement of the neural 
activity patterns elicited by the just-concluded event (Silva et al., 2019; Sols, DuBrow, Davachi, 
& Fuentemilla, 2017). This replay is thought to serve the strengthening of the just encoded 
memory trace and/or the integration of the discrete events into a temporally coherent memory se-
quence. Further evidence for the influence of event segmentation on episodic memory formation 
comes from studies showing that memory for individual items and their temporal order is en-
hanced if those items are experienced within the same event rather than across different events 
(i.e., divided by an event boundary; e.g., Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011; Radvansky & Copeland, 
2006). Moreover, the better an individual’s segmentation agrees with the average segmentation 
pattern of a given reference group, the better their memory for the corresponding events (e.g., 
Sargent et al., 2013).   
While there is considerable evidence to support the view that event segmentation plays a 
pivotal role for the formation of naturalistic event memories, fewer studies have investigated 
how these memories change over time (e.g., Conway, Cohen, & Stanhope, 1991; Furman, Dorf-
man, Hasson, Davachi, & Dudai, 2007; Sekeres, Bonasia, St-Laurent, Pishdadian, Winocur, 
Grady, & Moscovitch, 2016). In particular, our understanding of how consolidation and forget-




in memories for discrete stimuli, such as single words or pictures. Previous work has shown that 
contextual details of complex memoranda such as narratives or autobiographical memories are 
lost at a faster rate than central elements (“gist”) of the original experience (e.g., Bahrick, 1984; 
Sekeres et al., 2016; Thorndyke, 1977). Furman, Dorfman, Hasson, Davachi, & Dudai (2007) 
conducted a study in which participants watched a 27 min movie clip and then performed a cued 
recall test a time ranging from 3 hours to 9 months after watching the film. The researchers 
found that while memory for the central events of the movie was retained even months after par-
ticipants watched the movie, recall accuracy was higher when less time had passed between 
watching the movie and taking the test. Similar findings were reported in another study that used 
multiple brief film clips to probe the fate of event memories over time (Sekeres et al., 2016). 
Over the course of one week, memory for the peripheral details of events contained in the film 
clips declined rapidly, while memory for the central themes—the “gist” of the events—was 
largely retained. 
The above findings are consistent with prevailing theories of memory consolidation. Con-
solidation is the process by which memories become stronger over time, as they are stored in 
long-term memory (Dewar et. al., 2014; Dudai, 2004). Researchers distinguish at least two kinds 
of consolidation. The first one is known as synaptic consolidation (Dudai, 2004). Synaptic con-
solidation occurs in the hippocampus within minutes to hours after learning (Dudai, 2004). The 
second type of consolidation is systems consolidation. This latter consolidation process is 
thought to operate on a much longer timescale of days to years and involves a reorganization of 
memory representations at the brain systems level. All episodic memories are assumed to ini-
tially depend on the hippocampus, which links together disparate representations from multiple 




memories to be increasingly supported by distributed cortical areas (Nadel, Samsonovitch, Ryan, 
& Moscovitch, 2000; Squire,  Genzel, Wixted, & Morris 2015). At least three models on the na-
ture of such hippocampal-cortical dialogue have been proposed. One model suggests that hippo-
campal “replay” of memories, i.e., their coordinated reactivation across hippocampus and cortex 
during sleep or wakeful rest results in strengthening of the corresponding cortical linkages (e.g., 
Alvarez & Squire, 1994). Other models posit that consolidation is accompanied by changes in 
the nature of the memories (McClelland et al., 1995; Winocur & Moscovitch 2011). Trace trans-
formation theory (TTT, Moscovitch, Cabeza, Winocur, & Nadel, 2016) suggests that repeated 
reactivations of episodic memories result in transformation of the initial memory trace into new 
traces that retain and schematic features but fewer episodic and contextual details. Unlike the 
original detailed memories that remain dependent on the hippocampus, the transformed memo-
ries are represented outside of the hippocampus in distributed cortical networks. Similarly, the 
complementary learning systems (CLS; McClelland et al., 1995) theory proposes that hippocam-
pal replay enables slow extraction of commonalities across overlapping experiences, thereby in-
tegrating newly acquired memories into preexisting schemas that are represented in the cortex. 
Notably, the latter two theories assume that consolidation involves some form of generalization 
such that not all details of the original episodic memory trace are maintained.  
However, how consolidation-related processes change the nature of naturalistic event 
representations is less clear (Sekeres et al., 2018). In order to address this question, we recorded 
EEG while participants were watching a 33-minute movie clip followed immediately by a free 
recall test. They were asked to come in again a week later for another recall test. Rather than fo-
cusing on the EEG measures, this thesis asked how the passage of time would affect the ability to 




integration (Levine, Svobota,  Hay, Winocur & Moscovitch, 2002). Based on this evidence re-
viewed above, we predicted that the content of remembered events would be less rich after a 
week delay, meaning that fewer details would be remembered.  
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants 
We collected data from a total of 35 participants but a technical defect rendered audio 
data from 22 participants unusable. The final sample thus consisted of 13 young adults (12 right-
handed, 5 female, age range 18-26 years, mean age 21.84 years) who had never seen the movie 
or read the novel “Howl’s Moving Castle”. Participants were recruited from a subject pool of 
students who were enrolled in an introductory psychology course or were recruited from the 
Queens College campus community. They participated for course credit or were paid $15 per 
hour. All participants were proficient in English, with no history of psychiatric or neurological 
disorders, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants in accordance with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Queens College.  
2.2 Stimuli 
The movie stimulus was a 33-min segment of the animated fantasy film “Howl’s Moving 
Castle” (Studio Ghibli, 2004). The full movie is 1h 59 mins long and tells the story of an inse-
cure young girl named Sophie who is turned into an old woman by a spiteful witch. Sophie en-
counters a wizard named Howl who she falls in love with. The bond makes both of them grow 
personally and eventually proves to be the key to breaking the witch’s spell. The movie clip was 
presented in 3 segments of ~10 mins each, divided by self-paced breaks. Timing of the two 




raters, see below). This was done as a cautionary measure to reduce the risks of artifacts in the 
EEG data (e.g., due to movement).  
2.3 Experimental Procedure 
The procedure was adopted from a previous study by Chen and colleagues (2017). Partic-
ipants watched the first 33 minutes of "Howl’s Moving Castle" in English. They were given min-
imal instructions, but were told to watch the movie as though it was a movie they were interested 
in. They were also told that they would be asked to verbally describe the movie afterwards. Fol-
lowing the end of the movie, participants were asked to count aloud from 1 to 1001. Next, they 
were asked to freely recall the movie clip without cues, while their speech was being recorded 
(immediate recall). Participants were instructed to retell what they had just seen in as much detail 
as possible, to relate events in the order in which they occurred, and to try to speak for at least 
ten minutes. They were told that completeness and detail were more important than exact order, 
and that if at any point they realized they had forgotten something, to go back and recount it. Par-
ticipants were then allowed to speak for as long as they wished, and verbally indicated when they 
had finished by saying something like “I’m done.” While they were speaking, they were pre-
sented with a static black screen with a central white dot, but were not asked to fixate on the dot. 
There was no interaction with the experimenter until the participant was finished speaking. At 
the end of the free recall session, were instructed not to talk to anyone about the movie they saw, 
and were asked not to look up any information about the movie, or the book on which it was 
based. Participants returned approximately 7 days later to perform a second free recall session 
(delayed recall). The procedure was the same as for the first free recall session. 
 





Presentation® software (Neurobehavioral System, version 21.0) was used to display the 
movie stimulus and to synchronize stimulus onset with the EEG recoding. The movie’s audio 
signal was delivered using in-ear headphones (ER1, Etymotic Research, Inc.). Participants’ 
speech was recorded using a microphone and Presentation’s built-in audio recording feature (Au-
dioRecorder). The movie was presented on a 27-inch TFT monitor. Participants were seated 
about 90 cm (35 inches) away from the screen.  
2.4 Event Coding and Verbal Recall Data Analysis 
In order to determine event boundaries in the original movie clip, five independent raters, 
who did not take part in the study, were asked to watch the movie and then annotate—as pre-
cisely as possible—the time point at which the scene changed (cf. Silva et al., 2019). These are 
points at which there is a major change in topic, time, or location. We also asked raters to write 
down a short title for each event. An event boundary was deemed reliable and included in the 
analysis if at least 3 out of the 5 raters agreed on the temporal point at which it happened (within 
+- 3 seconds). Using these criteria, we obtained a list of 56 events for the 33-min movie segment. 
Event length ranged from 5 secs to 116 secs (M = 28 secs, SD = 19 secs). 
The length of the audio recordings for the first recall session ranged from 3 to 19 
minutes, with a mean recall time of 10 minutes. Recall length for the delayed recall session was 
very similar, ranging from 3 to 24 minutes, with a mean of 10 minutes. Audio recordings for 
both sessions were transcribed (see Appendix, for an example) and then analyzed in order to ac-
cess overall recall performance (percentage of movie events recalled) and amount of details in 
the memory reports. Each of the 56 events from the list described above was classified as re-
called if the participant remembered any part of it. For each participant, we calculated the per-




recalled in an earlier or later position of the storyline compared to when it actually occurred in 
the movie. We also examined whether participants recalled any information that was not part of 
the movie (false memories). In the immediate recall condition, 9 out of 13 participants remem-
bered at least one detail that wasn’t in the movie with an average of 1.85 false memories (SD = 
2.19).  In the delayed recall condition, 10 out of 13 participants recalled at least one detail that 
was not present in the movie with an average of 2.62 false memories (SD = 3.07). In all cases, 
the false memory concerned minor details, usually a detail about a feature of an event e.g., the 
appearance of an object or a detail about a character e.g. the character’s appearance or relation-
ship to the protagonist. One participant had an unusually high number of false memories in both 
the immediate and delayed recall conditions (7 and 11 false memories respectively). To ensure 
that the high number of false memories did not bias our results, we performed all analyses ex-
cluding this participant, and found that the results did not change.  
In order to determine how the passage of time effected the amount of event details partic-
ipants recalled, we scored each sentence of the recall transcripts using five dimensions as defined 
by Levine et. al., (2002; see Table 1). Every sentence in a given participant’s transcript was 
given a score from 0 to 3 in order to rate the richness of the informational bits. A score of 3 was 
given if the description was rich, highly specific, evocative and/or vivid, and appeared to emerge 
from a feeling of re-experiencing. A score of 2 was given if the description was detailed, but fell 
short in the degree of richness and so could not be given a score of 3. A score of 1 was given if 
the description was limited to general, non-specific information but was still episodic. A score of 
0 was given if no information was provided for the specified dimension, if the information was 
semantic rather than episodic, or if erroneous information was recalled. We use the term seman-




recollection of the movie contents as such. The scores for each dimension were summed, result-
ing in five scores per participant. Table 2 shows sample scores for three participants describing 
the same event. 
Table 1. Description of the dimensions used to analyze event contents.   
Dimension Description 
Time Year, season, month, day of week, time of day 
Place Localization of an event, including, city, 
street, building, room, part of room 
Perceptual Auditory, olfactory, tactile, taste, visual and 
visual details, body position 
Thought/Emotion Emotional state, thoughts, implications 
Temporal Integration Integration into a larger timescale as evi-







Table 2.  Sample Scores for Three Sentences Describing an Event. 




She runs into these 
two guards and then 
they try to talk to 
her.  
0 0 0 0 0 
She looks at the 
guards and the 
guards try to have 
their way with her. 
0 0 2 0 0 
And as she’s walk-
ing, she goes down 
an alleyway where 
she’s confronted by 
two guards, which 
try to advance on 
her making her feel 
uncomfortable and 
threatened. 
0 3 1 3 0 
 
2.5 Statistical Analysis 
In order to analyze whether the percent of events recalled by participants was signifi-
cantly different between the immediate and delayed recall conditions, we performed the Wil-
coxon signed-rank test with testing session as the independent variable and percent of events re-
called as the dependent variable. In order to determine whether the richness of events changed 
significantly from immediate to delayed recall, we performed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with 
testing session as the independent variable and the summed scores for the given dimension as the 
dependent variable. Type-I error rate was set to  = .05. Bonferroni correction was used to con-




the number of tests performed. Effect sizes, r, were calculated from the normal approximation of 
the distribution of the test statistic as 𝑟 =
𝑧
√𝑁
.   
3. Results 
During the immediate recall condition, participants were able to remember an average of 
51.2% of the events (SD = 16%). In the delayed recall condition, participants were able to recall 
an average of 48.9% of the events (SD = 17%). There was no significant difference in the percent 
of events recalled by participants between the immediate (Mdn = 55.4%) and delayed (Mdn = 
53.6%) recall conditions, V = 54.5, p = 0.53, r = −.17. This result suggests that time between 
testing sessions did not have an effect on the percent of events recalled by participants.  








Time 3 (2) 3 (3) 0.69 -0.11 
Place 23 (31) 24 (30) 0.21 -0.35 
Perceptual 50 (91) 65 (74) 0.97 -0.007 
Thought/Emotion 16 (46) 15 (43) 0.78 -0.08 
Temporal Integration 19 (24) 19 (31) 0.41 -0.23 
Note:  Md = Median, IQR = Interquartile Range. 
Table 3 shows the summed detail scores for each of the five event dimensions (time, 




dimension in each condition is also reported. For none of the dimensions, Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests revealed a significant difference between the immediate and delayed recall. These results 
suggest that time between sessions did not have an effect on the richness of events recalled by 
participants.   
4. Discussion 
The present study sought to understand how the passage of time affects memory for de-
tails of naturalistic events. We found that over the course of one week neither the overall number 
of recalled events from an audiovisual movie nor the detailedness of memories changed. 
The former finding is broadly consistent with an earlier study that used similar stimulus 
material but probed event memory with a cued recall task (Furman et al., 2007). In particular, the 
aforementioned study did not find memory performance differences between groups of partici-
pants that were tested 3 hours vs. 1 week after viewing the movie, whereas recall accuracy stead-
ily declined from 1 week to 3 weeks to several months post initial encoding. Thus, the present 
study might have revealed changes in event recall performance over time if memory had been 
tested after longer delays. There is, however, there is a crucial difference in the way memory was 
assessed in our study (free recall) and in that by Furman and colleagues (cued recall). Providing 
recall cues has been shown to substantially enhance naturalistic memory performance in previous 
work (Robin and Moscovitch, 2014; Sekeres et al., 2016; Winocur et al., 1981). Indeed, Sekeres 
and colleagues (2016) observed a significant decline in memory performance over a time course 
of 7 days for both central elements of naturalistic film clips and peripheral details. Although the 
authors did not segment the movies into events as defined in the present study, their findings 





Which factors might account for the divergent findings? One possible cause is that 
Sekeres and colleagues (2016) used a total of 40 short, unrelated film clips as stimulus material, 
whereas participants in our study watched a single, coherent movie segment. Previous research 
has consistently shown superior recall performance for information that is presented as a narra-
tive, including novels, movies, and plays (Cohen, 1996; Lichtenstein and Brewer, 1989; Rubin 
1977). As such, memory for the longer movie clip could have benefitted from its inherent the-
matic structure that can be linked to preexisting event schemas and socially relevant knowledge 
(cf. Furman et al., 2007). 
Another plausible reason for the high delayed memory performance in the present study 
is that participants actively retrieved the movie contents immediately after encoding. The so-
called “testing effect”—better retention due to repeated retrieval or restudying of the to-be-re-
membered material—is a robust phenomenon that has been observed across multiple memory 
domains (e.g., Wheeler et al., 2003; Carpenter and Pashler, 2007; Carpenter et al., 2006). In or-
der to prevent the testing effect from biasing findings of time-dependent changes in memory, 
studies typically either test only subsets of the initially encoded stimulus material at different de-
lays or use a between-subjects design with each group’s recall performance measured at a single 
delay only. We decided against these options for two main reasons. First and foremost, the pre-
sent study aims to use event-specific multivariate EEG activation patterns to track changes in 
neural event representations from immediate to delayed recall. This comparison is harder to im-
plement when using different sets of events in the two recall sessions. A potential workaround 




natural language processing tools, such as sentence embedding2, to determine whether events 
with higher semantic overlap come to be represented more similarly over time.   
Second the data reported here are part of a larger developmental project that compares 
naturalistic event memory in children and young adults. Testing participants repeatedly with sub-
sets of the original stimulus material would require at least two movie segments and thus in-
crease the duration of the experiment to an extent that is unsuitable for younger participants. Al-
ternatively, using a between-subjects design would dramatically increase the required sample 
size and reduce power. 
Still, the current findings highlight the shortcomings of the chosen approach and call for 
reconsideration of the study design. Thus, future experiments could use an alternative design in 
which two movies are used as experimental stimuli. Participants would watch both movies, and 
then perform an immediate free recall test for only one of them. Later, they would perform a sec-
ond recall test for the other movie. The order of recall would be counterbalanced across partici-
pants. This type of design would allow researchers to understand how time effects event memory 
without the immediate recall session serving as a way of rehearsing the events. 
Finally, we cannot exclude the possibility that participants did seek information about the 
movie after completing the first session, despite being asked not to do so. In order to avoid this 
potential confound, future studies could use of a movie stimulus that is not available outside the 
lab—although this solution is not trivial to implement.   
 
2 Sentence embedding denotes a collection of machine learning algorithms aimed at quantifying semantic similari-
ties between sentences or paragraphs based on their distributional properties in large corpora of language data using 




Perhaps more puzzling was our finding that the passage of time did not have an effect on 
the ability to recall episodic details pertaining to time, place, perceptual features, thoughts, and 
emotions. The present result contrasts with a considerable body of previous evidence that periph-
eral details are susceptible to rapid forgetting (e.g., Bahrick, 1984; Sekeres et al., 2016; Thorn-
dyke, 1977).  Again, the testing effect provides a plausible explanation. Immediate retrieval of 
the movie contents could have preserved not only memory for the central elements, i.e., events, 
but also the fine details. One piece of evidence that may support this explanation is that partici-
pants oftin recalled many of the same details in the delayed recall condition as in the immediate 
recall condition including the major events in the narrative, as well as details that were not di-
rectly related to the events of the story e.g. character’s’ physical appearances. Indeed, partici-
pants who recalled a detail that was not present in the movie—a false memory—in the immedi-
ate recall condition recalled the same detail in the delayed recall condition. Additionally, event 
recall was far from perfect during immediate recall (just above 50% of the original movie events) 
but then remained virtually stable over the course of a week, indicating that initial retrieval im-
munized the memory trace against further degradation or transformation. Although the precise 
mechanisms underlying this mnemonic benefit remain somewhat hazy (Carpenter, 2009; Pyc and 
Rawson, 2007), the current findings is consistent with theories of memory consolidation that em-
phasize the co-existence of both detailed and gist-like memory traces (Winocur and Moscovitch, 
2011). Such a conclusion, however, warrants caution given that the recall delay in this study was 
relatively short (7 days), while systems consolidation in humans is typically thought to operate 
on timescales of multiple weeks to several years.  
Since systems consolidation is thought to be accompanied by changes in the structure of 




study might provide valuable further insights. Time-dependent transformation of memory repre-
sentations between immediate and delayed recall should be reflected in systematic changes of 
event-specific brain patterns (cf. Baldassano et. al., 2017, Silva et. al., 2019). Such changes are 
typically measured using representational similarity analysis approaches, in which spatio-tem-
poral activity patterns, i.e., matrices of raw voltages across electrodes and timepoints, are corre-
lated (a) within vs. across event boundaries and (b) between viewing vs. recall of a given event. 
Neural measures might be more sensitive to potential subtle effects of short-term memory reor-
ganization during the consolidation period than the reported behavioral measures.   
A few general methodological weaknesses of the current study further limit the generali-
zability of our findings and thus are discussed in the following. First, our final sample size was 
very small. Although adequate sample size is important for having sufficient statistical power to 
detect an effect (Cohen, 1992), the very small effect size estimates for the reported analyses sug-
gest that lack of power was not the primary issue in this investigation. The only exception was 
spatial details (place), with a small to medium effect size estimate (r = -0.35). Still, the experi-
ment needs to be repeated with a larger sample, potentially using a modified design as detailed 
above. Other potential issues arise from the scale that was used to characterize the richness of 
event details recalled by participants (Levine et al., 2002). The scale was devised to study autobi-
ographical memory and therefore might not be quite adequate for the narrative quality of the 
movie stimulus used in the present study. Some of the dimensions used in the scale—particularly 
time —could be difficult to relate when retelling a narrative that is not about oneself because it 
can be difficult to gain information about these dimensions from a movie. For example, in an au-
tobiographical memory, one might say something like, “I remember it was a Saturday morning in 




chose. There are two possible solutions to this problem. One is to be more rigorous in selecting 
the experimental stimulus, choosing movies where there are very clear indications of time. This 
could include a visual cue—such as the leaves changing colors, indicating that it’s autumn—or 
auditory cues—such as a character in the film explicitly stating that it’s Saturday. However, this 
could limit the types of films used to study event richness. A more comprehensive solution may 
be to modify the scale used by Levine et. al., (2002), so it is more appropriate for studying natu-
ralistic memory. For example, the definitions of dimensions such as time could be modified, or 
simply not included. Alternatively, different scoring methods, such as implemented in the River-
mead Behavioral Memory Test (Wilson, Cockburn, & Baddeley, 1991) could be used. Further-
more, subjectivity of the ratings themselves could be problematic. Future studies should include 
multiple raters for each participant to assess interrater-reliability. Another problem with the scale 
is that it does not differentiate between central and peripheral details. Previous studies have 
found that central details and “gist-like” memories are not forgotten at the same rate (Sekeres et 
al., 2016). It is possible that the central details of the narrative would remain stable over time, 
while the peripheral details would be forgotten. Future studies should differentiate between cen-
tral and peripheral details in order to determine if both types would remain stable. In order to ac-
complish this, central and peripheral details would need to be defined. A central detail could be 
defined as any detail that is critical to understanding the events of a given narrative (Sekeres et 
al., 2016; Thorndyke 1977), while a peripheral detail could be defined as any detail that is part of 
the narrative, but not critical for understanding an event. Using these definitions, individual tran-
scripts of participants could be analyzed to determine how many of each detail type they remem-





The present study sought to understand how the passage of time effects memory for epi-
sodic details of naturalistic events. We found that the passage of time did not significantly affect 
any of the variables studied. Future studies should use a larger sample and a modified method to 
score details from participants’ recall data, as well as an alternative design using two movies as 
stimuli to avoid testing effects.   
6. Appendix 
 
Sample Transcript Movie Recall 
 
Okay, so the movie started with the castle moving through the fog, the giant castle with a bunch 
of different moving parts. And then the scene changed over to a village or town or seemed like a 
city actually. We were then introduced to Sophie who works at a hatter shop. So basically you 
meet Sophie in a hatter’s shop. She seems to be a little disappointed in her life. We then meet 
Howl because Sophie was going to go visit her sister at the bakery. And while she was on her 
way to the bakery, these two soldiers walked up to her and they were trying to flirt with her. But 
then Howl came and used a spell to make them walk away, and leave her alone, and then he took 
her and they started flying through the air as they were evading these different blob creatures. Af-
terwards, he dropped her off at—he dropped Sophie off at her sister's bakery. And her and her 
sister were talking. Her sister was telling her she doesn't have to work at the Hatters shop any-
more. She should do what she wants what she wants with her life. That's all. So, what happened 
after that?  After that, Sophie went back to the Hatter shop, it was late at night, and then the 
witch came in and cast a spell on her turning her old. Sophie started to freak out. She was pacing 
back and forth. And she was just kind of hoping that this whole thing was a, was a bad dream, 
but she woke up the next day and she was the same person, and her mother then walks up the 
stairs and she wants to go see her daughter, but Sophie tells her don't come in, I have a cold. So-
phie then gets dressed up and takes some food and then decides to go to the wastelands to go find 
Howler because she knows he's the only way that she could get back to normal. On the way there 
she meets a scarecrow with a turnip head. She told the scarecrow that she didn't like turnips since 
she was a kid. What else? Then Howl’s castle appeared. She went in and then she met, she met 
Calcifer the fire demon. And they made a pact together that they would help each other to break 
each other's spells. Then Sophie woke up the next morning and there was a child who walked 
down the stairs who was able to turn into…who uses a spell  to shapeshift himself into an older 
man. And the government started to knock on their door and there's many different doors that 
they handle. There's a knob that allows them to switch between these doors. There's a door that 
goes to the main, the Royal city. Then there's a door that goes to the wastelands which was part 
of Howl’s castle. And then there was a door for the Grand Wizard. And basically, the government 
was at their door telling them because Howl poses as different wizards so the government wants 




she was seeing all the different places that you could go to. But then the child gets angry and 
then they decided to have breakfast, and Sophie manipulates Calcifer into making breakfast by 
blackmailing him, and as she's making breakfast Howl walks in and it's the same wizard as be-
fore that she had, that she had flown with. Then Howler takes, Howl makes breakfast for all of 
them. And Marco who was the little boy says he hasn't eaten this great in a while. 
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